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Abstract
Nowadays, improving road safety is one of the major challenges in developed
countries and, to this regard, attaining more effectiveness in the enforcement
of road safety policies has become a key target. In particular, enforcing the
requirements related to the technical and administrative mandatory documen-
tation of on-the-road motor vehicles is one of the critical issues. The use of
modern technologies in the context of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)
could enable the design of a more convenient, frequent and effective enforcement
system compared to the traditional human patrol controls. In this article we
propose a novel system for the on-the-fly verification of mandatory technical
and administrative documentation of motor vehicles. Vehicles not complying
with the required regulations will be identified and sanctioned whereas those
vehicles, observant of the mandatory regulations, will maintain anonymity and
non-traceability of their whereabouts. The proposed system is based on the use
of anonymous credentials which will be loaded onto the vehicle to automatically
and on-the-fly prove holdership of required credentials without requiring the ve-
hicle to stop beside the road. We also implement a prototype of the credential
system and analyze the feasibility of our solution in terms of computational cost
and time to perform such telematic controls.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, improving road safety is one of the major challenges in devel-
oped countries. Effectiveness of road safety policies enforcement is related to
the intensity of controls and compliance with safety requirements. Regulating
technical and administrative requirements on vehicles (such as registration cer-
tificates or mandatory periodic technical inspections) is part of current strategies
to achieve a better road safety. Current regulations usually require a vehicle or
its keeper to hold five different documents in order to assert its compliance with
mandatory requirements: certificate of conformity (or technical characteristics
certificate), registration certificate, valid and up-to-date technical inspection re-
port, proofs of up-to-date motor vehicle local tax and compulsory third party
insurance payment. However current situation is far away from its solution (e.g.,
in Spain 400.000 cars were reported of being driven without having passed the
mandatory technical inspection in 2009 [1]).
The use of information and communication technologies in vehicular envi-
ronments has led to a new family of advanced services that have been referred
to as Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). In this type of systems it is
assumed that vehicles count with sensing, processing, and communicating ca-
pabilities. Under this assumption, it is possible to build a more convenient,
frequent and effective telematic road enforcement system while reducing the
number of human patrols deployed to control road stretches. The system will
be more convenient because ITS can make possible the telematic on–the–road
verification of the documents –that is, without the car needing to stop and
presenting the documents to a traffic agent–, provided that a set of equivalent
electronic documents are issued. With an ITS–based road enforcement system,
the frequency of document inspection can be set as a dynamically configurable
parameter, and its possibilities will be mainly limited by the size and availability
of the deployed road side infrastructure. The system will be more effective in
two ways. Firstly, well–designed electronic credentials will be more difficult to
forge than current paper–based ones. Secondly, if such credentials verification
is unsatisfactory, a fine could be immediately issued by the Traffic Authority
and notified to the offender [2].
Electronic License Plates (ELP) or Electronic Chasis Number (ECN) have
already been suggested as long-term electronic identities for vehicles and it is
assumed that vehicles will hold a public key certificate linked to that identity
[3]. This credential could be understood as an electronic registration certificate.
Therefore, a first solution would consider the issuance of electronic creden-
tials, such as attribute certificates, linked to that long-term identity, that attest
each of the remaining mandatory requirements. Nodes of the road side infras-
tructure could require passing by vehicles to send these credentials and prove
their holdership. However, creating such a system raises critical privacy con-
cerns, as it may enable the Traffic Authority or other nearby entities to easily
track vehicles and their drivers and know all attributes encoded in the creden-
tials.
In ITS scenarios, the use of a set of pseudonyms has been devised as an
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alternative mechanism to authenticate vehicles. A public key certificate will be
issued for each pseudonym, with a relatively short-term validity period, such as
a week, and used only during a short period of time, such as a minute [4]. The
certification authority issuing the certificates also serves as an identity escrow
agent to satisfy the principle of accountability for malicious vehicle behaviors.
Therefore, a second solution would consider the issuance of attribute cer-
tificates linked to each of the pseudonym-based certificates a vehicle holds. Al-
ternatively, instead of issuing attribute certificates for all the pseudonym-based
certificates hold by a vehicle, only a specific subset or a separate set of cer-
tificates may be considered. However, the most convenient option under this
approach would be to issue the pseudonym-based certificates with attribute ex-
tensions representing the satisfaction of the mandatory requirements. However,
besides the privacy issues arising in pseudonym-based credential systems [5], the
main problem of this type of solution is the credential life-cycle management
(certificate issuance, revocation, refilling, etc.) of such a huge number of certifi-
cates. In the addressed scenario, this problem will be worse as the satisfaction
of each mandatory requirement grants an authorization for a different validity
period, starting at different times. In the more convenient pseudonym-based
setting (certificates with attribute extensions), vehicles will only obtain valid
credentials for the period in which all requirements are satisfied. Once the va-
lidity period of one requirement expires, vehicles will be forced to retrieve a
new set of certificates. Moreover, if the verification of a set of credentials fails
because the vehicle does not have valid credentials, it would not be possible
to distinguish which requirement is not being fulfilled at the time of detection.
Finally, public key and attribute certificates do not operate on the premises of
minimal disclosure of information, i.e., when a certificate is shown, all attributes
in the certificate are revealed at the same time.
By contrast, an anonymous attribute-based credential system (ABC-system)
allows users authentication while guaranteeing partial information disclosure
and unlinkability. Attribute-based anonymous credentials are certificates that
provide the subject with a digital identity composed by a set of attributes.
Users of anonymous credentials are able to prove, to a verifying entity, hold-
ership of the credential, knowledge of all attribute values or that such values
satisfy a given property (such as belonging to a range or satisfying a function).
Moreover, users can choose to disclose a set of attributes while keeping oth-
ers hidden (partial disclosure of information). Moreover, verifiers cannot link
a request with a specific user or with other past requests (unlinkability). Fi-
nally, anonymous credential systems may allow for credential revocation and
anonymity revocation (de–anonymity) ensuring accountability of misuses and
misbehaviours.
Indeed, the privacy by design feature of anonymous credentials make them
very attractive and highly suitable for the representation of authorizations re-
quired by regulations over motor vehicles. In this work we explore the feasibility
of such an approach by proposing a privacy-preserving and accountable telem-
atic on-the-road verification system of motor vehicle authorizations, being these
authorizations represented by anonymous attribute-based credentials. To the
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best of our knowledge, this is the first proposal in the literature addressing this
topic.
The main two technologies being currently developed for the implementation
of anonymous credentials correspond to U-Prove [6, 7, 8] and Idemix [9, 10, 11]
systems provided by Microsoft and IBM, respectively. Although, both systems
present many core-concept similarities, they also differ on many other aspects,
namely the mathematical foundations and the functionality features which have
actually been implemented. Although our proposal is not based on any of these
systems we briefly comment on their main characteristics. As for U-Prove, its
current implementation offers the following features: (1) It allows proof of pos-
session of the credential without disclosing the actual credential, (2) It preserves
issuance-show unlinkability, this is, the authority issuing the credential cannot
link the credential issued with the credential being shown to the verifying entity
and, (3) It allows partial information disclosure, meaning that when showing
the credential, the user can disclose only some of the attributes in the creden-
tial, proving to the verifying party that those attributes were certified by the
issuer without disclosing the other attributes. By contrast, it does not offer
multi-show unlinkability (different uses or shows of the same credential can be
linked together) and the user (credential holder) cannot prove that two of its
undisclosed attributes hold the same value when being encoded into the same or
into two different credentials. Due to the latter two non-implemented features
we have not adopted the U-Prove technology.
By contrast, Idemix is a much more featured and developed system offering
the following interesting functionalities: (1) It allows proof of possession of the
credential, (2) It preserves issuance-show unlinkability, (3) It allows partial infor-
mation disclosure, (4) multi-show unlinkability and, (5) cross-credential proving
(attributes encoded in one credential can be proven to hold a =, >=, <=, >,<
relation with another attribute encoded in a different credential). However,
despite the extra functionalities offered by Idemix, we have not adopted this
system either. The intention of this work is to promote an alternative technol-
ogy to the two major systems. Our work is based on the anonymous credential
system presented by Persiano et al. in [12], being the main reasons to adopt
such an approach the following:
• Persiano et al.’s work is easy to understand and therefore easier to cus-
tomize and modify.
• Similar features to those (1) to (5) of Idemix can be implemented.
• The showing credential protocol can be made non-interactive.
• Finally, as credential revocation would break the issuance-show property,
it stands as the biggest challenge of anonymous credential technologies
and not very practical approaches have been adopted for revocation in the
two major systems. On one hand Idemix white-listing revocation process,
based on accumulators [9], is not really applicable in the vehicular network
scenario because of scalability reasons. On the other hand, revocation in
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U-Prove is only possible when untraceability is not a requirement, which
is not our case.
The specific contributions of this work are the following ones:
1. We propose an anonymous ABC-system to represent main motor vehicle
authorizations required by current regulations. The different parts of the
overall system we propose are based on the anonymous credential system
presented by Persiano et al. in [12] and the work of Camenisch et al. in
[13]. A vehicle can prove that it holds the required credentials, all linked to
the same long-term identity (license number), while guaranteeing minimal
disclosure information of the private attributes encoded in the credentials
and unlinkability between different credential shows. The system also uses
a specific set of pseudonym-based certificates which allows for (1) the re-
trieval of the identity of vehicles unobservant of mandatory requirements,
(2) the collection of non-repudiation evidences of such vehicles, and (3) the
revocation of vehicular mandatory authorizations. The use of pseudonym-
based certificates to provide these properties allows a smooth integration
with current approaches in ITS [4].
2. We have adapted Persiano and Visconti anonymous credential system to
make it non-interactive and to allow the validation of multiple credentials
held by the same entity and encoding the same private attribute (cross-
credential proving).
3. We have implemented the adapted Persiano and Visconti anonymous cre-
dential system on a standard PC platform. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, it is the first implementation of such a system.
4. We provide with a comprehensive analysis of the fullfilment of the security
objectives and of the performance of the proposed system, showing that
it is suitable for vehicular scenarios1.
After presenting related work and background in Sections 2 and 3, the model
of the system is described in Section 4. Next, Section 5 contains a detailed de-
scription of the proposed system. The security and performance of the system
are analyzed in Sections 6 and 7. Finally, conclusions are presented in Sec-
tion 8. For completness purposes, Appendix A summarizes the mathematical
foundations and assumptions of this work.
2. Related work
Although there is a large body of research work related to the security
and privacy in VANETs, very few of them address traffic law enforcement
([14, 15, 16, 17]). Most of them are focused in providing privacy-preserving
1Vehicular platforms are expected to have slightly less computational capacities than stan-
dard PCs. However, performance figures on the selected platform can be used to reasonably
estimate figures on the vehicular one.
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systems (respect to vehicle’s identity and location) for Electronic Toll Pricing
(ETP), speeding ticketing, and ‘Pay-As-You-Drive’ (PAYD) systems. But none
of these systems addresses the privacy-preserving verification of motor vehi-
cles’ mandatory authorizations. Moreover, none of these proposals are based on
anonymous credentials systems although [14] suggests that they would be an
interesting approach to complement parts of their proposal.
On the other hand, the European Commission (EC) is working on building
credentials of motor vehicles and drivers in electronic format and has suggested
the use of smart cards as the physical support for driving licenses [18, 19, 20].
Such electronic formats may constitute a significant barrier against illegal cre-
dential creation and an opportunity to apply new and more efficient enforcement
mechanisms. As an example, the European Traffic Police Network (TISPOL)
has envisioned a new automated driver identification system based on an elec-
tronic driver’s license [21]. In Spain, it is already enacted that the vehicle’s
technical inspection card will be issued in electronic format (although vehicle’s
owners will still receive a copy in paper format) [22]. However, the options that
are being considered to represent these electronic credentials are X.509 public
key certificates and plain electronic signatures (such as XMLDSig).
Finally, as one of the contributions of this paper addresses the implemen-
tation of an anonymous credential system, several representative recent devel-
opments must be considered. Idemix has been already implemented in smart
cards (e.g. [23]), also including the selective disclosure feature [24]. Similarly, an
implementation of U-Prove on these devices can be found at [25]. Nevertheless,
to the best to the authors’ knowledge there are no implementations of Persiano
and Visconti credential system.
3. Background
In this Section, a short introduction to Intelligent Transportation Systems
(ITS) and Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) is presented to the reader.
The use of information and communication technologies in vehicular envi-
ronments has led to a new family of advanced services that have been referred to
as Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). Thanks to ITSs, drivers can have
more immediate and accurate information concerning the road traffic status and
passengers can enjoy entertainment applications.
Given that vehicles are moving at a relatively high speed, connectivity is a
critical issue in these environments. In order to promote a permanent communi-
cation to and from vehicles, a specific type of network (called Vehicular Ad-Hoc
Network and usually referred to as VANET) has been proposed.
The usual elements appearing in a VANET scenario are depicted in Figure
1. Thus, there exists a set of communication nodes placed aside the roads
that are called Road–Side Units (RSUs). RSUs are assumed to have a resilient
connection with other infrastructure nodes. Trusted Third Parties (TTPs), the
road traffic authority or the ITS–related service providers belong to such set of
infrastructure entities.
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In order to exchange data to and from vehicles, they need to be equipped
with specific communication and processing hardware and software. All these
components are referred to as On–Board Equipment (OBE) and three main
elements are usually considered [26]: first, a set of sensors that enables having a
real-time vision of the vehicle status and its surroundings; second, a Hardware
Security Module (HSM) which provides with secure storage, reliable time source
and cryptographic capabilities; and third, an On-Board Unit (OBU) which is
a communication device that enables exchanging data not only with RSUs,
but also with other surrounding OBUs. System architectures, such as the one
developed within the SeVeCom project [4, 27], allow the implementation of
secure vehicular communication systems.
Given the specific constraints that affect the vehicular data transmission, a
new communication technology is being developed. It is commonly referred to as
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) and it is specifically tailored
for this context. The whole architecture of DSRC is being standardized in the
IEEE 1609 family of standards [28].
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Figure 1: Usual elements in a vehicular network scenario. (source: adapted from [29])
4. System model
4.1. Context
We assume that there exists an architecture such as the one described in
Section 3. In particular, we assume that vehicles’ on–board equipment follows
a design and architecture such as the one proposed in [27]. In summary, each
vehicle counts with a communication unit (OBU), a hardware security module
(HSM) with an internal trusted time source. The HSM stores the vehicle’s
cryptographic material and allows to operate with it securely.
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Furthermore, we assume that vehicles have been issued several credentials
as in [4]. Firstly, each vehicle U has a long-term identity IDU (equivalent to
the vehicle’s license number). Each long-term identity has associated a key pair
(SKU , PKU ), generated by the HSM, and a set of attributes atts. A public key
certificate CU = Cert(IDU , PKU , long validity period, atts) is issued by a CA.
Secondly, vehicles also generate a set of n short-term key pairs ((SKiU , PK
i
U )
with i from 1 to n) which will be associated to a set of pseudonyms SiU . A certi-
fication authority CAP issues a set of pseudonym-based public key certificates:
CERT = {Cert(SiU , PKiU , short validity period) : i = 1 . . . n}
From time to time (e.g., a year), vehicles obtain a new set CERT . Vehicles use
these certificates to authenticate safety messages over DSRC [30]. A Revocation
Authority RAP publishes periodically Certificate Revocation Lists CRL that
allow entities to verify the state of a pseudonym-based certificates in CERT .
We also assume the existence of Road Side Units (RSU). RSUs also have an
HSM and can communicate with service providers and authorities. We assume
that RSUs have an identifier IDV and a key pair (SKV , PKV ) that is bound
to its identifier by a public key certificate Cert(IDV , PKV , validity period).
Vehicles communicate with each other and with RSUs through a communication
network following the IEEE 1609 Family of Standards (WAVE) [28].
Additionally to CU (long-term public key certificate) and the set CERT
(short-term pseudonym-based public key certificates), we assume that there also
exist other agents that are in charge of issuing current motor vehicle paper-based
mandatory authorizations or the equivalent (traditional) in electronic form. In
particular, we assume that the Traffic Authority TA issues vehicle’s registration
certificates (and fines to misbehaving vehicles), Technical Inspector Agents issue
technical inspection certificates, Tax Companies issue proof of payment of local
motor vehicle tax, and Insurance Companies provide proofs of compulsory third
party insurance payments.
4.2. Equivalent anonymous vehicular credentials
Within our system, equivalent anonymous attribute-based vehicular cre-
dentials are generated to substitute the paper–based or electronic non–privacy
aware vehicular mandatory authorizations (the registration certificate, the tech-
nical inspection certificate, the proof of payment of local motor vehicle tax, and
the proof of compulsory third party insurance payments). We denote these four
anonymous credentials by ACA, ACB , ACC and ACD. There exists a Trusted
Authority O, responsible for the anonymous credential system setup, and a set
of Trusted Authorities OA, OB , OC and OD, dependant of O and responsible
for issuing the credentials ACA, ACB , ACC and ACD to vehicles. The on–
the–fly telematic verification of vehicular mandatory authorizations will consist
in the showing of randomized and unlinkable versions of these four anonymous
credentials. To allow for credential revocation and de–anonymization, these
randomized versions are built using (and associated to) single–use pseudonym–
based public key certificates.
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Therefore, besides the long–term public key certificate CU and the set CERT
of pseudonym-based certificates, for each vehicle, an additional set CERT of m
pseudonym-based certificates is issued:
CERT = {Cert(S jU , PK
j
U , short validity period) : j = 1 . . .m}
A Certification Authority CAP issues certificates in set CERT and a Revoca-
tion Authority RAP periodically publishes Certificate Revocation Lists CRL
regarding those certificates. These certificates are used by vehicles to create ev-
idence that will allow, if necessary, the retrieval of the vehicle’s identity from the
credential verification response. Using a set CERT , different from set CERT ,
allows a vehicle to know in advance which is the pseudonym S
j
U to be used
next in the pre-computation of the necessary data for the telematic verification
process (this is not possible if set CERT is used). Each of the certificates in
CERT is used at most once. When they are all used or expired, a new set CERT
is issued. The revocation of certificates in CERT conforms the revocation pro-
cess of the anonymous credential ACA. The remaining credentials do not need
revocation, as explained in Section 4.4.
4.3. System overview
The specific entities that participate in the system are the following ones.
Vehicles that are asked to prove their credentials will be denoted as U . Other
vehicles (denoted by W ) may participate in the protocol if witnesses’ evidences
are required. The verifier agents will be denoted by V and are assumed to
be deployed dynamically and strategically among the set of RSUs (we do not
address the details of verifier agents’ deployment in this paper). Verifier agents
can order an associated videocamera V C to take photographs to passing–by
vehicles. Videocameras are assumed to be placed relatively close to the RSU
where the associated verifier agent is deployed. It is assumed that a secure
communication channel exists between V and V C. In the proposed system
verifier agents V communicate telematically with specific passing–by vehicles
U while vehicles are moving. Verification agents V may communicate with
other entities that form part of the infrastructure. These entities are the Traffic
Authority TA, an Adjudicator Adj and a public repository.
As previously described, we assume that the vehicle has been issued the
long–term public key certificate CU and the set CERT of pseudonym–based
certificates and that all these credentials and their corresponding cryptographic
material have been loaded on the vehicle’s HSM. Besides, we also assume that
the vehicle has the vehicular mandatory authorizations, which may be in a
paper–based or electronic format, and that these credentials are under the con-
trol of the vehicle’s keeper.
Table 1 provides a summary of the used notation throughout the paper.
4.4. Phases
The system we propose consists on the following phases.
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Table 1: Notation used in the description of our proposal.
Symbol Meaning
d Private RSA exponent such that 3 d = 1 mod φ(N).
a div e The whole part resulting of the division of integer a by integer e.
(e,N) Public RSA key (N is an RSA modulus product of two safe primes).
Z∗N Set of co-primes with N .
H(m)
Result of applying a cryptographic hash function H on message
m.
∈R Randomly chosen.
Enc(m,x) Encryption of message m with key x.
Sig(m,x) Signature of message m with key x.
(SKU ,PKU ) Entity U ’s long-term key pair.
(SKiU ,PK
i
U ) The i-th short-term key pair in CERT of entity U .
S
j
U
The j-th pseudonym in set CERT of entity U .
(SK
j
U ,PK
j
U )
The j-th short-term key pair CERT of entity U for the verification
process.
sk Secret derived from entity U ’s SKU .
(SKX ,PKX) Entity X’s key pair (with X being V , V C or Adj).
1. Pseudonym-based Certificates Issuing. As a result of this phase, certifi-
cates of set CERT are issued and loaded into the vehicle’s HSM. Also, the
specific application software in charge of the execution of the credential
verification protocol in the vehicle, is securely deployed on the vehicle’s
OBE.
2. Anonymous Credential System SetUp. The trusted authority O executes
this setup phase to generate a couple of tuples (PubO and PrivO) hold-
ing all the public and secret global parameters used by the actors of the
anonymous credential system. Trusted authorities OA, OB , OC and OD
are assigned a subset of the parameters from the tuples PubO and PrivO.
3. Anonymous Credentials Issuing. During this phase, an entity U approaches
the corresponding authorities OA, OB , OC and OD to obtain the corre-
sponding anonymous credentials ACA, ACB , ACC and ACD. Note that,
although we do not address the specific logistic or operational details of
how entity U initiates the anonymous credentials issuing process, we sug-
gest that, firstly, entity U should demonstrate to be the authorized holder
of the appropriate non–anonymous version of the credentials, either if they
are on a paper–based format or on an electronic one. Besides, the process
could be designed to be initiated by the vehicle or it could need some
previous action or collaboration of the vehicle keeper. For the purposes of
this work, anonymous credentials contain two private attributes denoted
as x1, equivalent to IDU (the long-term identification of the vehicle), and
x2, a secret derived from sk (attribute x2 is of the form g
sk
2 where sk is
SKU , entity U ’s long-term private key, or a secret derived from it); cre-
dentials also contain three open-atributes α3, α4 and α5, specifying the
first two of them the period of validity of the credential (valid from and
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not valid after)2. Note that the validity period of ACA will be similar
to Cert(IDU , PKU , long validity period, atts) but the validity period of
ACB , ACC and ACD is expected to be much shorter (one year for ACC
and ACD, and two to four years for ACB). These credentials are loaded
into the vehicle’s HSM.
4. Anonymous Credentials Joint Proving. This phase can be further divided
in two parts: a first offline part and a second online part.
(a) Offline part. In the offline part, entity U pre-computes a set of ses-
sion commitments and follows the steps to construct the results of
a series of four non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledges
(ZK-PoK-1 to ZK-PoK-4)3. For this purpose, U choses a random
factor y and uses it to produce randomized versions of each anony-
mous credential ACA, ACB , ACC and ACD, using the next avail-
able pseudonym S
j
U . Note that the j-th pseudonym will be used
only once. The result of the pre-computation of commitments and
non-interactive ZK-PoKs will serve to prove the following list of core
statements:
• ZK-PoK-1 : That the attribute x1 (private) is common to the
four credentials, that U has the knowledge of secret sk encoded
in attribute x2 (private), that the credentials also encode the
appropriate open-attributes, and that the correct pseudonym S
j
U
has been used to construct the proofs.
• ZK-PoK-2 : That commitments are properly constructed.
• ZK-PoK-3 : That the credentials ACA to ACD encode a valid
signature (i.e., authority OA has signed ACA and so on).
• ZK-PoK-4 : That the vehicle has indeed computed commitments
and the previous ZK-PoKs. For this, U must prove knowledge
of the random factor y.
(b) Online part. In the online part, entity V selects a passing-by vehicle
U which is using a pseudonym SiU at that moment for the authenti-
cation of DSRC messages [30]. V requests U to prove holdership of
its mandatory authorizations. After receiving the request, U sends
V a response message, signed with its short-term private key SK
j
U .
Besides other data, the response message contains commitments of
each credential, and the pre-computed non-interactive ZK-PoK-1 to
ZK-PoK-4 over the randomized versions of ACA to ACD.
Then, V performs two sets of verifications. Firstly, V assesses the
feasibility of retrieving the identity of U from the response message
it has sent to V (identity inspection feasibility). If it is not feasi-
ble, V orders V C to take a photo of passing–by vehicle U . V collects
2The third open-attribute α5 is not specifically used in the system proposed herein, al-
though an immediate use would be to encode the vehicle’s type, which can be used to enforce
policies that restrict the type of vehicles that can be driven depending on the time of the day.
3For an explanation of ZK-PoK, see Appendix A
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available evidence (the photo and other collected evidence such as ac-
knowledgements sent by surrounding vehicles W taking the approach
proposed in [31]) and sends it to adjudicator Adj (so it can take a
decision about calling the RSU or the vehicle to revision). Secondly,
if the first set of verifications are successful, V proceeds to verify the
vehicle’s credentials (credentials validity). V verifies the revocation
status of U ’s certificate, the correctness of open–attributes, and the
four non–interactive ZK–PoKs. If these verifications fail, V collects
available evidence and sends it to the Traffic Authority TA (so it can
take a decision about a possible U ’s unobservance and the appropri-
ateness of fining U).
5. Pseudonym-based Certificates Revocation. From the set of vehicular manda-
tory authorizations that a vehicle must hold, we assume that only the reg-
istration certificate may need to be revoked online and without physically
inspecting the vehicle (e.g., the vehicle has been stolen). It is reasonable
to assume that if a technical inspection credential needs to be revoked,
the vehicle will be at the inspector premises. Therefore, the correspond-
ing anonymous credential can be deleted or updated. We assume that the
proofs of payment of local motor vehicle tax and compulsory third party
insurance do not need to be revoked online or offline; they just expire.
The revocation of certificates in CERT is used herein to assess the valid-
ity of anonymous credential ACA and can be understood as a temporal
de-registration of the vehicle. Permanent de-registrations will consider the
deletion of ACA.
6. Pseudonym-based Certificates Refilling and Anonymous Credentials Up-
date. From time to time, vehicles will need to refill sets CERT and CERT .
Anonymous credential ACA persists during the time the vehicle is regis-
tered, but anonymous credentials ACB , ACC and ACD expire and need
to be updated.
4.5. Security requirements
Correctness. The system works correctly if, when a vehicle U fails to prove
holdership of the required credentials, its identity can be retrieved and available
(and sufficient) evidence is collected in order that a third party can determine
whether a fine should be issued (i.e., the vehicle is accountable for driving with-
out appropriate credentials). The system should not be able to fine a vehicle
that has correctly executed the credentials proving protocol and counts on valid
and up–to–date credentials.
Soundness. Vehicular credentials must be non-transferable and unforgeable.
Moreover, an adversary that captures transcripts of protocol executions should
not be able to use them to prove holdership of valid credentials.
Privacy. If a vehicle proves holdership of valid and up–to–date credentials
when required by a verifier agent, its identity must be preserved and it cannot be
traced by the system, in particular, different executions of the protocol between
the system and a vehicle cannot be linked by the system.
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4.6. Threat model
We assume that the following enitites are trusted to correctly execute the
proposed protocol: TA, CA, CAP , CAP , RAP , RAP , Adj and entity V C.
Regarding vehicles and RSUs, their HSMs are trusted (cryptographic material
cannot be transferred outside of them and it cannot be used by unathorized
software). However, OBUs of vehicles and RSUs can be compromised by an
adversary (messages can be captured, modified, deleted or inserted). Note that
we assume that verifiers V do not collude with other verifiers to share tran-
scripts of protocol executions or capture VANET messages of large areas. We
also assume that vehicles W that act as witness of exchanged messages collab-
orate in the protocol and, in particular, they do not collude to not send any
acknowledgement messages. We consider active adversaries that may have as
main interests: (1) to successfully pass an execution of the credentials verifi-
cation protocol without having valid and up-to-date credentials, (2) to avoid
being caught without valid and up-to-date credentials (e.g., another vehicle is
fined), and (3) to know the identity of passing-by vehicles (when it should not
be disclosed, i.e., vehicle holds valid and up-to-date credentials) or link different
protocol executions by the same vehicle.
5. System description
Phases 2, 3 and 4 directly related with the anonymous credential system,
and briefly described in Section 4.4, are detailed next. Note that, for the sake
of clarity, we describe the phases in detail using only two anonymous creden-
tials ACA and ACB (this description can be easily extrapolated to the four
anonymous credentials needed in the verification system).
5.1. Anonymous Credential System SetUp
The System SetUp protocol is based on and inherits the instructions from
the protocol Enroll presented in [12]. The algorithm is performed by an orga-
nization O which follows the steps described below.
1. O randomly picks two k − bit long safe primes p1 = 2q1 + 1, p2 = 2q2 + 1
such that gcd(3, φ(p1p2)) = 1, and sets N = p1p2;
2. Randomly picks e ∈ ZN such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1) and gcd(3, e) = 1;
3. Computes d ∈ ZN such that 3d ≡ 1(modφ(N)); (Note that the private
parameter d and public parameter e are not part of the same key pair).
4. Selects elements g, c ∈ ZN of large order;
5. Randomly picks elements v1, v2, v3A ,v3B , v4A ,v4B , v5A ,v5B , v6A ,v6B , and
sets g1 ≡ gv1 , g2 ≡ gv2 , g3A ≡ gv3A , g3B ≡ gv3B , g4A ≡ gv4A , g4B ≡ gv4B
, g5A ≡ gv5A , g5B ≡ gv5B , g6A ≡ gv6A , g6B ≡ gv6B (modN);
6. Computes s ≡ gd(modN);
7. Computes a cyclic group G of order N in which computing the dis-
crete logarithm (DL) is infeasible (e.g., G is computed as a subgroup
of Zq for a prime q such that N |(q − 1)), along with six more elements
h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 6= 1 of G;
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8. Outputs public information
PubO = (N, e, q, g, s, c, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, g1, g2, g3A , g4A , g5A , g6A , g3B , g4B , g5B , g6B )
9. Keeps the following private information
PrivO = (p1, p2, d, v1, v2, v3A , v4A , v5A , v6A , v3B , v4B , v5B , v6B )
10. Organizations OA and OB are given the corresponding tuples with public
and private parameters:
PubA = (N, e, q, g, s, c, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, g1, g2, g3A , g4A , g5A , g6A)
PrivA = (p1, p2, d, v1, v2, v3A , v4A , v5A , v6A)
PubB = (N, e, q, g, s, c, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, g1, g2, g3B , g4B , g5B , g6B )
PrivB = (p1, p2, d, v1, v2, v3B , v4B , v5B , v6B )
5.2. Anonymous Credential Issuing
In this phase the organization OA issues an anonymous credential ACA and
organization OB issues an anonymous credential ACB for an entity U , both
encoding attribute x1 such that 0 ≤ x1 < e. Note that for simplicity purposes,
attribute x2 is also the same in both credentials (x2 contains a secret sk 0 ≤ sk <
e derived from SKU ), however, this secret could be different for each anonymous
credential and the proof of its knowledge be performed independently from one
credential to another.
The Anonymous Credential Issuing protocol is based on and inherits the
instructions from the algorithms Enroll and IssueCred in [12]. The algorithm
is performed first by entity U with organization OA.
1. Entity U holds two non-privacy aware certificates that share a common
attribute x1 with the same value: Cert1 = (x1, α3, α4, α5) and Cert2 =
(x1, β3, β4, β5). U submits Cert1 together with x2 to OA and Cert2 to-
gether with x2 to OB .
2. The organization OA verifies the certificate Cert1, in particular, the value
of x1. OA also verifies that x2 = g
sk
2 modN , where sk is a secret derived
from the user’s private key SKU , and that U knows SKU so it knows how
to derive such a secret. We assume that such algorithm exists.
3. The organization randomly chooses α6, xA, such that 0 < α6 < e, α6
co-prime with e and not multiple of 3, and a value xA ∈ Z∗N ;
4. The organization sets and computes:
• aA ≡ gx11 x2 gα33A gα44A gα55A gα66AxAe(modN)
• bA ≡ c (modN)
• vA ≡ (aA + bA)d(modN)
5. The organization OA sends the tuple 〈x1, x2, α3, α4, α5, α6, xA, vA〉 to U ;
6. The entity U verifies the signature vA using the public key 3. The tuple
constitutes its anonymous certificate denoted as ACA.
Similarly, U executes the same protocol with organization OB . In this case,
U obtains from OB the tuple 〈x1, x2, β3, β4, β5, β6, xB , vB〉 as credential ACB .
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5.3. Anonymous Credential Joint Proving
This phase has been briefly described in Section 4.4 and consists on two
parts: an offline part and an online one. For the construction and verification
of ZKPoKs, the phase is based on and inherits various instructions from the
protocols ProveCred and VerifyCred in [12]. Such protocols have been ad-
justed to the new setting (where attributes to be verified belong to two different
credentials) according to the work in [13].
Description of the offline part :
1) Construct Commitments. U constructs a series of commitments in
relation to the credentials and stores them in CMT.
U : CMT←− [ ConstructCMT
2) Construct ZK-PoK-1 to ZK-PoK-4. The prover must then prove
knowledge on how those commitments have been constructed. The prover
A constructs four different non-interactive ZK-PoKs (ZK-PoK-1 to ZK-
PoK-4 ) and stores them in ZKPoK1, ZKPoK2, ZKPoK3, and ZKPoK4.
U : ZKPoK1←− [ ConstructZKPoK1
U : ZKPoK2←− [ ConstructZKPoK2
U : ZKPoK3←− [ ConstructZKPoK3
U : ZKPoK4←− [ ConstructZKPoK4
Description of the online part :
1) Credential Proving Request. V selects a vehicle U that is using
pseudonym SiU . V stores in EVIDV the signed beacon BEACON sent by
U . Then, V sends U a request for proving holdership of its credentials
and starts a timer.
V −→ U : Enc((cha, trequest), PKiU ), SiU ,
Sig((Enc((cha, trequest), PK
i
U ), S
i
U ), SKV ), Cert(IDV , PKV , validity period)
Other passing–by vehicles W send to V ACKs of having received the
request message. V stores them in ACKREQ and adds them to EVIDV.
2) Credential Proving Response. U stores the received message in REQ,
and adds it to EVIDU. U verifies the signature and the certificate. If
these verifications are succesful, U retrieves from its local storage CMT,
ZKPoK1, ZKPoK2, ZKPoK3, and ZKPoK4 and concatenates all these ele-
ments in PRV. U decrypts and verifies correcteness of challenge cha and
time trequest, if correct U sends back its response.
U −→ V : PRV, α3, α4, α5, β3, β4, β5,
Enc((cha, tresponse, Sig((PRV, α3, α4, α5, β3, β4, β5, cha, tresponse), SK
j
U ),
Cert(S
j
U , PK
j
U , short validity period)), PKV )
Other passing-by vehicles W send to U ACKs of having received the re-
sponse message. U stores them in ACKRES and adds them to EVIDU.
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3) Credential Proving Response Verification.
Verifications regarding the identity inspection feasibility.
(a) If V does not receive U ’s response within expected time (timer times
out), V exits step 3 and executes step 4.
(b) V stores the response in RES and adds it to EVIDV.
(c) V decrypts the challenge, the response time, the signature and the
certificate. Then, it verifies the challenge and the signature. If these
verifications fail, V exits step 3 and executes step 4.
Verifications regarding the credentials validity.
(d) V verifies the revocation status of the certificate using the last re-
ceived CRL. If this verification fails, V adds a reference of the CRL
to EVIDV, exits step 3 and executes step 5.
(e) V verifies the correctnes of the open-attributes sent in the message
(i.e. expiry dates). If this step fails, V exits step 3 and executes step
5.
(f) V retrieves CMT, ZKPoK1, ZKPoK2, ZKPoK3, and ZKPoK4 and per-
forms the following verifications:
VerifyZKPoK1(CMT,ZKPoK1)
VerifyZKPoK2(CMT,ZKPoK2)
VerifyZKPoK3(CMT,ZKPoK3)
VerifyZKPoK4(CMT,ZKPoK4)
If any of these verifications fails, V exits step 3 and executes step 5.
(g) If previous verifications are succesful, V sets Succesful V erification
in Feedback and executes step 6.
4) Dispute Resolution Request. If ACKREQ 6= null, V asks V C (over a
secure channel) to take a photograph of vehicle U and V C sends back V
a photo encrypted with entity Adj’s public key PKAdj . V , after receiving
the photo, stores it in ENCPHOTO and adds it to EVIDV.
V =⇒ V C : Take Photo, cha
V C =⇒ V : Enc(PHOTO, cha, PKAdj)
V sends to Adj (over a secure channel) a dispute resolution request con-
taining EVIDV. Then, Adj decrypts ENCPHOTO, recognizes U ’s license
number in the photo, and contacts U to request evidence EVIDU, if U has
it, for a time near trequest.
Adj =⇒ U : Evidence Request, trequest
U =⇒ Adj : EVIDU
Once Adj has all available evidence, it resolves if some of the devices
need to be called for a revision or some other corrective measure (e.g.,
for repeated failures). Finally, V sets Dispute Resolution Requested in
Feedback and executes step 6.
5) Fine Issuance Request. V sends to the Traffic Authority TA a fine is-
suance request containing EVIDV. Additionally, V sets Fine Issuance Requested
in Feedback and executes step 6.
16
V =⇒ TA : Fine Issuance Request,EVIDV
6) Feedback Publication. V publishes in a public repository a feedback
message to vehicle U indicating the result of the verification. U may access
this repository to check the result of this protocol execution.
V −→ Repository : trequest, cha,Enc((Feedback, SiU ), PKiU ),
Sig((trequest, cha,Enc((Feedback, S
i
U ), PK
i
U )), SKV ))
5.3.1. Construct Commitments (ConstructCMT)
The algorithm ConstructCMT consists of the following steps:
1. Entity U sets the following values for credential ACA:
• aA = gx11 x2 gα33A gα44A gα55A gα66AxAe(modN)
• bA ≡ c mod N
• mA ≡ (aA + bA) mod N
U repeats the steps for credential ACB , obtaining values aB , bB and mB .
2. Entity U randomizes the values just set: U randomly picks a value y such
that 0 ≤ y < e and computes for credential ACA:
• aˆA ≡ gy aA mod N
• bˆA ≡ gy bA mod N
• mˆA ≡ gy mA mod N ; thus we have: mˆA − aˆA − bˆA ≡ 0 mod N
• vˆA ≡ sy vA mod N
U repeats the steps for credential ACB , obtaining values aˆB , bˆB , mˆB and
vˆB .
3. U computes commitments on the values aA, bA and mA: U randomly
picks values {w1A , w2A , w3A} ∈R ZN and computes the following values in
G:
• Com(mˆA) = hmˆA1 h
w1A
2 mod q
• Com(aˆA) = haˆA3 h
w2A
4 mod q
• Com(bˆA) = hbˆA5 h
w3A
6 mod q
• ComA = Com(mˆA) Com(aˆA) Com(bˆA) mod q
U performs the same steps for values aB , bB and mB , by randomly pick-
ing values {w1B , w2B , w3B} ∈R ZN and computing Com(mˆB), Com(aˆB),
Com(bˆB), and ComB .
4. U stores in CMT the values aˆA and aˆB , and all commitments Com(mˆA),
Com(aˆA), Com(bˆA), Com(mˆB), Com(aˆB), Com(bˆB), ComA, ComB .
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5.3.2. ZK-PoK-1 (ConstructZKPoK1 and VerifyZKPoK1)
Both U and V execute ZK-PoK-1 to prove that x1 encoded in ACA and
x1 encoded in ACB are equal. Additionally, the verifier receives non-interactive
zero knowledge proof of knowledge that x2 encrypts sk (for simplicity pur-
poses, we assume the same sk in both credentials), and that the public at-
tributes α3, α4, α5 and β3, β4, β5 are included in the credentials. Therefore,
U must prove knowledge of a tuple of secrets (y, x1, x2, α6, xA) which computes
aˆA g3A
−α3g4A
−α4g5A
−α5 mod N and the tuple of secrets (y, x1, x2, β6, xB) which
computes aˆB g3B
−β3g4B
−β4g5B
−β5 mod N . (Note that on the one hand U never
loses control over neither the anonymous certificates encoding the attributes, nor
the private attributes, but only PoKs are realized; on the other hand, the val-
ues of the open attributes are sent to the verifier during the execution of this
protocol).
Steps of algorithm ConstructZKPoK1 are detailed below:
1. U chooses random values ry, r1, r2A , r2B , r6A , r6B ∈R Ze.
2. U chooses random values rA, rB ∈R Z∗N .
3. U computes tA = g
ry g1
r1 g2
r2A g6A
r6A reA mod N and tB = g
ry g1
r1 g2
r2B g6B
r6B reB mod
N as commitments.
4. U computes t = H(tA+S
j
U ) mod e as a challenge, where S
j
U is the entity’s
current pseudonym.
5. U computes the following responses:
• ρy = t y + ry mod e
• ρ1 = t x1 + r1 mod e
• ρ2A = t sk + r2A mod e
• ρ6A = t α6 + r6A mod e
• ρA = g(ty+ry)div e g(tx1+r1)div e1 g
(t sk+r2A )div e
2A
g
(tα6+r6A )div e
6A
(xA)
trA mod
N
Similarly, U computes the responses ρ2B , ρ6B and ρB .
6. U stores in ZKPoK1 the responses ρy, ρ1, ρ2A , ρ2B , ρ6A , ρ6B , ρA, ρB and
the values of tA and tB .
When the verifier executes algorithm VerifyZKPoK1(CMT, ZKPoK1), it
will accept the proof if and only if:(
(aˆA g3A
−α3 g4A
−α4 g5A
−α5)t tA = gρy g1ρ1 g
ρ2A
2 g
ρ6A
6A
ρeA
)∧(
(aˆB g3B
−β3 g4B
−β4 g5B
−β5)t tB = gρy g1ρ1 g
ρ2B
2 g
ρ6B
6B
ρeB) mod N
5.3.3. ZK-PoK-2 (ConstructZKPoK2 and VerifyZKPoK2)
Both entities, U and V , perform the zero knowledge proof of knowledge ZK-
PoK-2 to prove that commitments ComA and ComB are properly constructed.
For this, U must prove, in a zero knowledge fashion, knowledge of the tuple
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(mˆA, w1A , aˆA, w2A , bˆA, w3A), which is a (G, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6)-DL representa-
tion of ComA such that mˆA = aˆA+bˆA. Similarly, U must prove, in a zero knowl-
edge fashion, knowledge of a the tuple (mˆB , w1B , aˆB , w2B , bˆB , w3B ), which is a
(G, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6)-DL representation of ComB such that mˆB = aˆB + bˆB .
The following theorem will mathematically transform the specified proofs
into different ones of less complexity:
Theorem 1 (PoK- 2). Proving knowledge of the tuple (mˆA, w1A , aˆA, w2A , bˆA, w3A),
which is a (G, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6)-DL representation of ComA such that mˆA =
aˆA + bˆA, is equivalent to proving knowledge of the tuple (bˆA, w1A , w2A , w3A),
which is a (G, (h1 h5), h2, h4, h6)-DL representation of ComA (h1 h3)
−aˆA .
Proof.
w1A , w2A , w3A ∈R ZN
ComA
def
= Com(mˆA) Com(aˆA) Com(bˆA)
= hmˆA1 h
w1A
2 h
aˆA
3 h
w2A
4 h
bˆA
5 h
w3A
6 mod q
mˆA = aˆA + bˆA
⇔
ComA = h
aˆA+bˆA
1 h
w1A
2 h
aˆA
3 h
w2A
4 h
bˆA
5 h
w3A
6 mod q ⇔
ComA (h1 h3)
−aˆA = (h1 h5)bˆA h
w1A
2 h
w2A
4 h
w3A
6 mod q 
Two remarks: (1) Theorem 1 also applies to ComB and, (2) Theorem 1
dictates that to carry out ZK-PoK-2 the prover U must prove to the verifier
V knowledge of a DL-Representation of ComA (h1h3)
−aˆA and knowledge of a
DL-Representation of ComB (h1h3)
−aˆB .
Steps of algorithm ConstructZKPoK2 are detailed below:
1. U generates (rbˆA , r1A , r2A , r3A) ∈R Zq for some prime field Zq
2. U generates (rbˆB , r1B , r2B , r3B ) ∈R Zq for some prime field Zq
3. U computes tA = (h1 h5)
r ˆbA h
r1A
2 h
r2A
4 h
r3A
6 mod q as a commitment.
4. U computes tB = (h1 h5)
r ˆbB h
r1B
2 h
r2B
4 h
r3B
6 mod q as a commitment.
5. U computes h = H(tA + S
j
U ) as a challenge, where S
j
U is the entity’s
current pseudonym.
6. U computes the following responses:
• ρbˆA = h bˆA + rbˆA
• ρ1A = h w1A + r1A
• ρ2A = h w2A + r2A
• ρ3A = h w3A + r3A
Similarly, U computes the responses ρbˆB , ρ1B , ρ2B and ρ3B .
7. U stores in ZKPoK2 the responses ρbˆA , ρ1A , ρ2A , ρ3A , ρbˆB , ρ1B , ρ2B , ρ3B ,
and the values of tA and tB .
When the verifier executes algorithm VerifyZKPoK2(CMT,ZKPoK2), it will
accept if the following statement holds true:(
(ComA (h1 h3)
−aˆA)h tA = (h1 h5)
ρ ˆbA h
ρ1A
2 h
ρ2A
4 h
ρ3A
6 mod N
)∧(
(ComB (h1 h3)
−aˆB )h tB = (h1 h5)
ρ ˆbB h
ρ1B
2 h
ρ2B
4 h
ρ3B
6 mod N
)
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5.3.4. ZK-PoK-3 (ConstructZKPoK3 and VerifyZKPoK3)
Signatures vA and vB of credentials ACA and ACB respectively must also
be verified from the verifier’s viewpoint. As in previous proofs, entity U must
demonstrate knowledge of vA and vB as a valid signature without disclosing its
real value. In particular, U gives a zero knowledge proofs of knowledge of the
(Z∗N , 3)-root of the h1-part of the (G, h1, h2)-DL representation of Com(mˆA) as
well as of the (Z∗N , 3)-root of the h1-part of the (G, h1, h2)-DL representation of
Com(mˆB). In other words, U must prove that vˆA is the third root of mˆA and
that vˆB is the third root of mˆB .
Steps of algorithm ConstructZKPoK3 are detailed below:
• U chooses r1A ,r2A , r1B , r2B ∈ ZN
• U computes tA = hr
3
1A
1 h
r2A
2 mod q and tB = h
r31B
1 h
r2B
2 mod q.
• U computes h = H(tA + S jU ) and stores the first l most significant bits.
• For each bit of the l most significant bits of h:
– If bit = 0 then: ρ1A = r1A , ρ1B = r1B , ρ2A = r2A , ρ2B = r2B
– If bit = 1 then: ρ1A = r1A vˆA
−1 mod N , ρ1B = r1B vˆB
−1 mod N ,
ρ2A = r2A − ω1A(r1A vˆA−1)3 mod N , ρ2B = r2B − ω1B (r1B vˆB−1)3 mod N
• U stores in ZKPoK3 the responses ρ1A , ρ2A , ρ1B , ρ2B and the values of tA
and tB .
When the verifier executes algorithm VerifyZKPoK3(CMT,ZKPoK3), it will
accept if and only if the following statement holds true:
ifbit = 0⇒ (tA = hρ31A1 hρ2A2 mod q)∧ (tB = hρ31B1 hρ2B2 mod q)
ifbit = 1⇒ (tA = mˆAρ31A hρ2A2 mod q∧(tB = mˆBρ31B hρ2B2 mod q)
5.3.5. ZK-PoK-4 (ConstructZKPoK4 and VerifyZKPoK4)
Value y serves to blind the values aA, bA, mA, vA, aB , bB , mB and vB to
prevent linkage between different instances of the Anonymous Credential Joint
Proving protocol. If y was obtained by a malicious entity it may be possible to
obtain the values for aˆA, bˆA, mˆA, vˆA, aˆB , bˆB , mˆB and vˆB and therefore credential
shows becomes linkable to each other or to the specific user. Thus, entity U
must give zero knowledge proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm y to the
base g of the h5-part of the (G, h5, h6)-DL representation of ComA(bˆA)
c−1 to
the bases h5, h6, as well as, U must give zero knowledge proof of knowledge
of the discrete logarithm y to the base g of the h5-part of the (G, h5, h6)-DL
representation of ComB(bˆB)
c−1 to the bases h5, h6.
Notice that: ComA(bˆA) = h
bˆA
5 h
w3A
6 and that bˆA ≡ gybA ≡ gyc mod N , and
that ComB(bˆB) = h
bˆB
5 h
w3B
6 and that bˆB ≡ gy bB ≡ gy c mod N
Steps of algorithm ConstructZKPoK4 are detailed below:
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• U chooses r1A ,r2A , r1B , r2B ∈ ZN
• U computes tA = hg
r1A
5 h
r2A
6 mod q and tB = h
g
r1B
5 h
r2B
6 mod q.
• U computes h = H(tA + S jU ) and stores the first l most significant bits.
• For each bit of the l most significant bits of h:
– If bit = 0 then: ρ1A = r1A , ρ1B = r1B , ρ2A = r2A , ρ2B = r2B
– If bit = 1 then: ρ1A = r1A − y, ρ1B = r1B − y,
ρ2A = r2A − w3A c−1 gρ1A mod N , ρ2B = r2B − w3B c−1 gρ1B mod N
• U stores in ZKPoK4 the responses ρ1A , ρ2A , ρ1B , ρ2B and the values of tA
and tB .
When the verifier executes algorithm VerifyZKPoK4(CMT,ZKPoK4), it will
accept if and only if the following statement holds true:
ifbit = 0⇒ (tA = hgρ1A5 hρ2A6 mod q)∧ (tB = hgρ1B5 hρ2B6 mod q)
ifbit = 1⇒ (tA = (ComA(bA)c−1)gρ1A hρ2A6 mod q∧(tB = (ComB(bB)c−1)gρ1B hρ2B6 )
6. Security analysis
In the proposed system, motor vehicle mandatory authorizations are repre-
sented by the certificate Cert(IDU , PKU , long validity period), the set CERT
of pseudonym-based certificates and four anonymous credentials ACA, ACB ,
ACC and ACD.
Authenticity of all these credentials is guaranteed by the signature of the
trusted certification authorities CA, CAP , OA, OB , OC and OD, respectively.
Furthermore, the private keys associated with the certificates are generated and
exclusively used within vehicle U ’s HSM, so they cannot be transferred to other
vehicle Z, and anonymous credentials are treated as cryptographic material that
cannot be transferred outside of the HSM once they have been loaded in such
device. Moreover, anonymous credentials contain a secret derived from entity
U ’s long term private key SKU , so in order to prove holdership of any of them,
a vehicle must prove knowledge of that secret, hence providing unforgeability
and non-transferability of those credentials.
Regarding reply attacks, another vehicle Z cannot successfully use captured
response messages sent by a vehicle U to prove holdership of the required cre-
dentials, as Z will not be able to sign a fresh response message using private
key SK
j
U . Recall that such key will only be used once.
ZKPoKs, by definition, do not transfer any information to verifiers that has
not been provided by the prover and, also by definition, different executions
of the ZKPoKs are unlinkable [12]. Moreover, note that in our protocol, non-
interactive ZKPoKs are used, therefore verifiers are truly-honest (they cannot
select challenges to get additional information about the prover’s credentials).
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Some previous works have demonstrated that it is possible to trace vehicles
that authenticate VANET messages with single-use pseudonym-based certifi-
cates [5]. However, although elements cha and trequest are used to link a request
with a response but they are not transmitted in clear, and we restrict the use
of pseudonyms S
j
U to a single response, pseudonym-based certificates in CERT
cannot be traced. An adversary capturing traffic near the verifier V only learns
that one of the vehicles currently circulating at that point has answered the
request, but it does not know which one.
Verifier V is the only one that is able to link both pseudonyms S iU and
S
j
U (except in very sparse traffic conditions). However, note that we assume
that verifiers do not collude with other verifiers to share transcripts of protocol
executions or capture VANET messages for a large area in order to perform
attacks such as the described in [5]. Additionally, as elements cha and trequest
within the request and response messages are encrypted with different public
keys they cannot be used to link those messages.
Also, if a vehicle does not hold up-to-date certificates or the anonymous cre-
dentials are not valid, V will detect that certificate Cert(S
j
U , PK
j
U , short validity period)
is revoked and V will reject the ZKPoKs, respectively. Otherwise, the non-
interactive ZKPoKs sent by U do not leak any information about U (i.e., they
could have been generated by V as well) but as they are signed by U , using its
short-term private key SK
j
U , they constitute a non-repudiation evidence of U ’s
participation in the protocol and the status of its credentials.
In some cases, an adversary may delete request messages sent by a verifier
or disable the vehicle’s OBU with the intention of evading the proving request.
However, as the verifier may count on acknowledgement messages sent by sur-
rounding vehicles W , this information may be presented to the adjudicator Adj
so it can call the vehicle for revision (e.g., if it happens certain number of times).
A similar situation happens if an adversary prevents a vehicle, that holds the
required credentials, from sending correct response messages through its OBU
(before being sent), with the consequence of vehicle being called for a revision
(after several occurrences).
Moreover, an external adversary may try to delete or modify messages sent
by vehicle U (holding valid credentials) and received by the verifier V ’s commu-
nication device with the intention of vehicle U being called for revision. How-
ever, if the adversary has not jammed all the communications, U may count
on acknowledgement messages of U ’s response message sent by surrounding ve-
hicles W , and present them to Adj with the rest of elements stored by U as
evidence. With this information, Adj may decide to send a technician to revise
the RSU where that verifier agent V has been deployed. At the end, even if a
vehicle is called to a revision while holding the required credentials, verifier V
or an external adversary will not be able to learn U ’s identity and U will not
be incorrectly fined as it may even be able to prove holdership of credentials to
Adj if required to.
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Phase Average Time (ms)
System SetUp 40695
Anonymous Credential Issuing 188
Table 2: Computational cost of the Anonymous Credential System SetUp Phase and Anony-
mous Credential Issuing Phase for a single AC.
7. Performance analysis
In this Section, we will explore and describe the feasibility of our proposal in
terms of the time and computational effort for a passing-by vehicle to complete
the telematic proof of observance, of the mandatory regulations regarding the
technical and administrative on-the-road motor vehicle authorizations. Firstly,
we present results of the implementation of algorithms directly related to the
anonymous credential system and, secondly, we analyze results of the Anony-
mous Credentials Joint Proving Phase (Phase 4) taking into account all the
steps (other computations, message exchanges) that take place in the online
part of this phase.
7.1. Algorithms of the anonymous credential system
The anonymous credential system was prototyped on a PC platform Java
7 (update 3) and the experiments were conducted on a machine with an AMD
Athlon(tm) 64 X2 Dual Core Processor 4200 2.21GHz. All computations are
for a total of five attributes in each credential (two private-attributes and three
open-attributes).
According to the different phases described in Section 4.4, in Table 2 we
show the computational cost of the Anonymous Credential System SetUp Phase
(Phase 2) and of the Anonymous Credentials Issuing Phase for a single AC
(Phase 3). Furthermore in Table 3 we show the computational cost of the
algorithms ConstructCMT, ConstructZKPoK- (for ZKPoK-1 to ZKPoK-4) and
VerifyZKPoK- (for ZKPoK-1 to ZKPoK-4) used in the Anonymous Credentials
Joint Proving Phase (Phase 4). The times are the average out of 50 runs.
Furthermore, Table 4 summarizes the information shown in Table 3. It shows
the overall execution time for the Joint Anonymous Credential Proving phase,
for four credentials (ACA, ACB , ACC and ACD) each with five attributes, dis-
closing three of those attributes, and for different values of the security param-
eter l. The total average time to construct the commitments and the ZKPoKs
represents the total pre-computational time a vehicle U needs to be ready to
respond to the next credential verification request. The total average time to
verify the ZKPoKs represents only the total time a verifier needs to verify those
ZKPoKs received from U . Parameter l is the security parameter and it repre-
sents the number of times the ZKPOK3-4 are executed. As we can see, with
the maximum level of security (parameter l = 64) the total average times spent
by a prover and a verifier are respectively less than 49 seconds and less than 48
seconds, whereas for the minimum level of certainty about the verification of the
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Algorithms of the Anonymous Credential Joint Proving Phase
Average computation time (ms)
Algorithm Construct- VerifyZKPoK-(CMT,ZKPoK−)
CMT 1584 —
ZKPOK1 848 726
ZKPOK2 500 1004
ZKPOK3
Length of challenge l = 16 3908 3386
Length of challenge l = 22 5496 5474
Length of challenge l = 28 6982 6956
Length of challenge l = 34 8684 8610
Length of challenge l = 40 10290 10268
Length of challenge l = 46 11692 11598
Length of challenge l = 52 13180 13102
Length of challenge l = 64 16680 16520
ZKPOK4
Length of challenge l = 16 6954 6984
Length of challenge l = 22 9502 9532
Length of challenge l = 28 12184 12226
Length of challenge l = 34 15136 15190
Length of challenge l = 40 17834 17864
Length of challenge l = 46 20318 20334
Length of challenge l = 52 22912 22928
Length of challenge l = 64 29000 29056
Table 3: Computational cost of each of the algorithms used in our proposal in terms of the
average time consumed.
Algorithms of the Anonymous Credential Joint Proving Phase
Total average computation time (ms)
Length of challenge l = 16 l = 22 l = 28 l = 34 l = 40 l = 46 l = 52 l = 64
Prover 13794 17930 22098 26752 31056 34942 39024 48612
Verifier 12100 16736 20912 25530 29862 33662 37760 47306
Table 4: Total computational cost of the algorithms executed by prover and verifier in terms
of the average time consumed.
ZKPOK3 and ZKPOK4 (parameter l = 14), the total average times consumed
by a prover and a verifier are respectively less than 14 seconds and less than 13
seconds.
Finally, Table 5 shows the total size (number of bits) of the different data
elements that entity U has to store in PRV, to sign (along with other data
elements) and finally to send to V . These calculations allow us to estimate, for
a modulo length(N) = 1024, length(e) = 448 and, length(q) = 448 bits, a final
size of PRV of length(PRV) = 52864 bits (6.608 Kbytes).
7.2. Online part of the Anonymous Credential Joint Proving Phase
In this subsection, the computational and transmission costs produced in the
online phase of the anonymous credential joint proving are analysed. For this
purpose, the computational capabilities of vehicular communication networks
and computational devices will be assumed. Concerning the communication
network, it will be based on Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC)
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Algorithms of the Anonymous Credential Joint Proving Phase
Size of data elements result of the algorithms (bits)
Element Items
Length of
Total length
each item
CMT
aˆA, aˆB , aˆC , aˆD length(N) 4*length(N)
Com(mˆA), Com(aˆA), Com(bˆA)
length(q) 16*length(q)
Com(mˆB), Com(aˆB), Com(bˆB)
Com(mˆC), Com(aˆC), Com(bˆC)
Com(mˆD), Com(aˆD), Com(bˆD)
ComA , ComB , ComC , ComD
ZKPoK1
ρy, ρ1, ρ2A , ρ2B , ρ6A , ρ6B length(e) 10*length(e)
ρ2C , ρ2D , ρ6C , ρ6D
ρA, ρB , ρC , ρD , tA, tB , tC , tD length(N) 8*length(N)
ZKPoK2
ρbˆA , ρ1A , ρ2A , ρ3A , ρbˆB , ρ1B , ρ2B , ρ3B
length(q) 20*length(q)ρbˆC , ρ1C , ρ2C , ρ3C , ρbˆD , ρ1D , ρ2D , ρ3D
tA, tB , tC , tD
ZKPoK3
ρ1A , ρ2A , ρ1B , ρ2B , ρ1C , ρ2C ρ1D , ρ2D length(N) 8*length(N)
tA , tB , tC , tD length(q) 4*length(q)
ZKPoK4
ρ1A , ρ2A , ρ1B , ρ2B , ρ1C , ρ2C , ρ1D , ρ2D length(N) 8*length(N)
tA , tB , tC , tD length(q) 4*length(q)
PRV 28*length(N)+44*length(q)+10*length(e)
Table 5: Size of data elements in PRV, constructed for the anonymous verification of creden-
tials ACA, ACB , ACC and ACD.
technology, which has a bandwidth of 6 Mbit/s [32]. With respect to the com-
putational devices, performance figures provided by CycurV2X4’s manufacturer
will be considered.
In this part of the process, the main computational tasks are related to
encryption and digital signatures. The aforementioned device takes 27.938 ms.
for encryption and 21.26 ms. for decryption. Digital signatures are computed in
7.156 ms. and verified in 27.114 ms. The aforementioned figures are the result of
applying ECIES encryption and ECDSA signatures over 16 bytes of data. Such
algorithms are chosen in compliance with IEEE 1609.2 standard [30]. Note that
while the performance of ECDSA is not significantly affected by the message
length (as it starts by applying a hash over the message), ECIES performance
grows accordingly. As its foundations lie on a symmetric encryption algorithm,
it will be assumed that the encryption time grows linearly with respect to the
message length.
In order to calculate the costs of this phase it is necessary to determine the
message length. For this purpose, cha, open-attributes (αi, βi, γi and δi for
i = 3 . . . 5) and the time marks trequest and tresponse are assumed to be 4 bytes
length. Public key certificates are 125 bytes and digital signatures are 56 bytes
in size, according to SAE J2735 standard [33]. The remaining data elements’
sizes are shown in Table 5. Size of exchanged messages is shown in Table 6.
4https://www.escrypt.com
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Online part of the Anonymous Credential Joint Proving Phase
Size of exchanged messages (bytes)
Message Size of each element in message Total size
REQ 4 + 4 + 4 + 56 + 125 193
RES 6608 + 48 + 8 + 56 + 125 6845
Table 6: Size of messages exchanged between U and V during the online part of the Anony-
mous Credential Joint Proving Phase.
Online part of the Anonymous Credential Joint Proving Phase
Consumed time (ms.)
Step Computation time Transmission time Total time
U V U ↔ V
Cred. Prov. Request 21.124 0.26 21.384
Cred. Prov. Response 85.976 9.126 95.102
Cred. Prov. Response Verification
Identity inspection feasibility 278.106 —
47584.106
Credentials validity 47306.00 —
Table 7: Time consumed in the main steps of the online part of the Anonymous Credential
Joint Proving Phase.
Taking these elements into account, consumed times in steps Cred. Prov.
Request, Cred. Prov. Response, and Cred. Prov. Response Verification
of the online part of the Anonymous Credential Joint Proving Phase are shown
in Table 7.
The request step takes 21.124 ms. of computation for V , and 0.26 ms. of
transmission. Concerning the response step, it takes 85.976 ms. of computation
time for U , and 9.126 ms. of transmission. The set of sub–steps regarding the
verification of the identity inspection feasibility, within the response verification
step, takes 278.106 ms. The set of sub–steps regarding the credentials validity
verification, also within the response verification step, takes 47306.00 ms. It
should be noted that computation times should be enlarged with the cost of
verifying the status of public key certificates (for which no reference performance
figures exist in this environment). On the other hand, even if V computational
capabilities would be higher than those available for U , these calculations enable
having a worst-case analysis. One important issue is to determine the feasibility
of this part of the process in a realistic driving environment. Particularly, it is
critical to assess whether it can be performed between a vehicle and a single
V (i.e. a single Road-Side Unit), or it is necessary to perform a hand-over
between different verifiers. In a real driving environment, the maximum (legal)
speed is usually 120 km/h. Given that DSRC coverage area is 1 km., a vehicle
remains 30000 ms. within a single V ’s range. At the light of the previous
results, it may be seen that the steps of the process that need U being in the
range of V (Cred. Prov. Request, Cred. Prov. Respose and steps (a) to (c)
of Cred. Prov. Response Verification) can be performed within the 30 s.
time frame. As a consequence, the online part may be performed between a
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vehicle (U) and a single RSU (V ). Moreover, the total amount of time taken
before V starts the credentials validity verification, i.e., before V must decide if
it is necessary to take a photo to vehicle U , is 394.592 ms. In this time, a vehicle
at a speed of 120 km/h will cover 13.15 m., that is a distance short enough to
have the assurance that videocamera V C is going to take a photo of the right
vehicle.
8. Conclusions
Nowadays, the verification of the status of road traffic credentials incurs
in a significant cost due to the required manpower. Moreover, it introduces a
privacy threat as the credentials’ content have to be fully shown to the veri-
fier, enabling the chance of tracking. To contribute on this issue, in this work
a novel privacy-preserving and accountable verification system for vehicular
mandatory authorizations has been proposed. The process is designed to be
performed electronically on-the-road. For this purpose, a set of anonymous cre-
dentials, based on existing driving authorizations, has been designed. In order
to prove such credentials, several proof-of-knowledge cryptographic mechanisms
have been adapted.
The system ensures that vehicles with valid credentials remain anonymous,
no matter the amount of verifications performed. On the contrary, vehicles
without valid credentials will have their identity revealed. In this way, the pro-
posed approach constitutes a suitable tradeoff between privacy preservation and
offenders’ accountability. Experimental results show that the system is suitable
for vehicular scenarios, considering both the limitation of available computa-
tional resources and the unreliability of communication networks.
Future work will be focused on three main issues. On the one hand, the
system will be expanded to cope with more specific, fine-grained verification of
authorizations, such as particular driving regulations for heavyweight vehicles.
On the other hand, driver’s credentials will be also considered, enabling further
verifications such as ensuring that the driver is entitled to drive a given vehi-
cle. Finally, the anonymous credential system will be evolved to comply with
the architecture for attribute–based technology specified within the ABC4Trust
project [34]. Additionally, it would be interesting to design similar systems to
the one proposed herein but based on U-Prove and Idemix.
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Appendix A. Mathematical foundations and assumptions
The system heavily relies on zero knowledge proofs of knowledge and com-
mitments. In this section, we offer the highlights of such constructions.
Appendix A.1. Zero Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge and Σ-protocols
A Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZK-PoK) makes reference to an
algorithm between two different entities, a Prover and a Verifier. Such proofs
must satisfy the properties of completeness, soundness and zero knowledge.
Loosely speaking, a ZK-PoK states that the prover can convince the verifier of
the knowledge of a secret if and only if the prover knows the secret and the
verifier learns nothing more about the secret than what he already knew about
it before the proof. The most common version for this type of construction is
based on the so called Σ-protocols which can be generalized (in the interactive
form) as a three move protocol in the following definition.
Definition 1. Σ-protocols. A protocol between a prover A and a verifier B
is called a Σ-protocol, with challenge set C, predicate P and a (secret) witness
x of a public parameter y, if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. A sends a commitment t to a verifier B.
2. B sends a random challenge c ∈ C to A.
3. A computes a response ρ(c;x) and sends ρ(c;x) to B, keeping value x as
the secret witness.
4. B acceptsA has knowledge of the secret x if and only if predicate P(t; c; ρ; y)
holds true; otherwise he rejects.
The result of taking a Σ-protocol and making the challenge the output of a
hash function over the commitment, is a non-interactive ZK-PoK, hence reduc-
ing the interaction necessary between prover and verifier.
Appendix A.2. Commitments
In our system, the commitments, based on Pedersen et al work ([35]), are
composed together with the ZK-PoK in the following manner:
1. Setup Phase: The verifier obtains from the system public parameters a
large prime q and a cyclic group G of order N (a product of two safe
primes), which is a subgroup of Zq. It also obtains a public parameter
h = gamod q. The values q,N, g, h are also public for the prover.
2. Commit Phase: The prover wants to commit to some x ∈ G. The prover
chooses random r ∈ G and sends c = gx ∗ hrmod q to the verifier. This is
simply gx ∗ (ga)r = gx+armod q
3. Proof Phase: The prover realizes a non interactive ZK-PoK over the tuple
of secrets (x, r).
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Appendix A.3. Σ-protocols Used in the Proposed System
The different parts of the overall system we propose are based on the anony-
mous credential system presented by Persiano et al. in [12], which is itself based
on the following mathematical blocks.
Appendix A.3.1. DL and RSA Representations
Definition 2. Discrete Logarithm Representation (DL-REP). Let G be a group
of order N and let y, g1, . . . , gm 6= 1 be elements of G. A (G, g1, . . . , gm)-DL
representation (DL-REP) of y is a tuple (x1, . . . , xm) such that ∀i = {1, . . . ,m},
0 ≤ xi ≤ N − 1 and y = gx11 ∗ . . . ∗ gxmm . Moreover, for i = 1, . . . ,m, we call xi
the gi-part of the (G, g1, . . . , gm)-DL representation (x1, . . . , xm) of y.
Definition 3. RSA Representation (RSA-REP) .Let e ∈ Z∗N be co-prime with
φ(N) and let y, g1, . . . , gm 6= 1 be elements of Z∗N . A (Z∗N , e, g1, . . . , gm)-RSA
representation (RSA-REP) of y is a tuple (x1, . . . , xm, x) such that y ≡ gx11 ∗
. . . ∗ gxmm ∗ xe mod N , 0 ≤ xi < e for i = 1, . . . ,m and x ∈ Z∗N .
Definition 4. (Z∗N , e)-root of an element. Let e be an element of Z∗N co-prime
with φ(N). A (Z∗N , e)-root of y ∈ Z∗N is an element x ∈ Z∗N such that xe ≡
y mod N .
Appendix A.3.2. ZK-PoK of DL and RSA Representations
A ZK-PoK of a DL-representation makes reference to a Σ-protocol between
two different entities, a prover and a verifier, in which the prover has to prove, in
a zero knowledge fashion, knowledge of a tuple of witnesses values (x1, . . . , xm)
of a public parameter y = gx11 ∗ . . . ∗ gxmm .
In a similar way, a ZK-PoK of a RSA-representation makes reference to
an Σ-protocol between two different entities, a prover and a verifier, in which
the prover has to prove, in a zero knowledge fashion, knowledge of a tuple of
witnesses values (x1, . . . , xm, x) of a public parameter y = g
x1
1 ∗ . . . ∗ gxmm ∗ xe.
Also, a ZK-PoK of the i-th part of a DL-Representation makes reference to
an algorithm between two different entities, a prover and a verifier, in which the
prover has to prove, in a zero knowledge fashion, knowledge of a witness value
(xi) of a public parameter y = g
x1
1 ∗ . . . ∗ gxmm .
Finally, a ZK-PoK of the e-th root of an element makes reference to an
algorithm between two different entities, a prover and a verifier, in which the
prover has to prove, in a zero knowledge fashion, knowledge of a witness value
x of a public parameter y such that xe ≡ y mod N .
In [36], the details of two interactive Σ-protocols can be found for ZK-PoKs
of DL and RSA representations. The author also provides formal proofs of the
completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge properties of the proofs, as well as
of the of existence of such proofs when the secret tuple of secrets (x1, . . . , xm)
satisfies a certain boolean formula Φ(x1, . . . , xm). The Σ-protocols for ZK-PoKs
of DL and RSA representations used in this proposal are based on those proposed
in [36]. Such schemes have been modified to make them non-interactive and, a
new Σ-protocol is defined to proof knowledge of a boolean composition of two
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RSA-representations with one shared secret. In [12] and [13], algorithms are
depicted to carry out ZK-PoKs of a part of a DL-representation and, ZK-PoKs
of the e-th root of a part of a DL-representation, respectively. Similarly, those
algorithms have been modified to be non-interactive and adapted to the scenario
in hand.
Appendix A.4. Computational Assumptions
The computational assumptions can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 1. On input an integer N , such that N = p1 ∗ p2 where p1 and p2
are primes of the same length, an integer e such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1 and
a, c ∈ ZN , it is hard to find in probabilistic polynomial time a pair (v, x) such
that ve = a ∗ x+ c (mod N) ([12]).
Lemma 2. Let G be a group of prime order q, and let {g1, . . . , gm} be random
elements of G. Assuming the discrete logarithm assumption in G, it holds that
no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can output, with non-negligible prob-
ability, an element h ∈ G and two different representations of h with respect to
some of the gi’s ([37]).
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